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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                                             Appellant
v.
THOMAS R. LLOYD, Mayor of Dormont Borough, individually and in his official
capacity; JOSEPH M. COSTANZO, former President of Dormont Borough Council,
individually and in his official capacity; KRISTEN DENNE, former Assistant Manager of
Dormont Borough, individually and in her official capacity; THOMAS H. AYOOB, III,
Solicitor of Dormont Borough, individually and in his official capacity; PATRICK
KELLY, Building Inspector/Code Enforcement Officer, individually and in his official
capacity; RUSSELL J. MCKIBBEN, former Interim Borough Manager and Police Chief
of Dormont Borough, individually and in his official capacity; DORMONT BOROUGH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:06-cv-01200)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 15, 2009
Before:  Sloviter, Ambro and Greenberg, Circuit Judges





George L. Koynok appeals pro se from a September 22, 2008 District Court order
dismissing his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow,
we will vacate the order and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I.  Background
Koynok owns property in Dormont Borough, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  In 2003,
he applied to the Dormont Borough Zoning Hearing Board (“ZHB”) for a variance so that
he might use the property (a single-family home) as a boardinghouse.  The variance was
denied in April 2003, and Koynok pursued a statutory appeal of the ZHB’s decision in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the
decision and dismissed the appeal.  
In 2005, Koynok again applied to the ZHB, this time for a “special exception” to
use his property as a boardinghouse.  The ZHB unanimously denied the special exception
in February 2006, on the ground that the zoning ordinance did not permit a use by special
exception for a boardinghouse in the district in which Koynok’s property is located. 
Koynok again pursued a statutory appeal.  The Court of Common Pleas denied the
statutory appeal in January 2007.  Koynok sought review in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court, which agreed with the ZHB’s conclusion that a boardinghouse is
    On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, Koynok raised three issues: (1) that the1
Borough failed to follow certain procedures in adopting its ordinances, rendering them
void; (2) that the 1991 occupancy permit authorizing his property to be used as a single-
family dwelling was fraudulently and mistakenly issued; and (3) that the Borough’s
witnesses committed fraud on the court by testifying that they had no knowledge of the
use of his property as anything but a single-family dwelling.  The Commonwealth Court
considered and rejected Koynok’s arguments.
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not a permitted use in Koynok’s district, and affirmed the decision in September 2007.  1
See Koynok v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Borough of Dormont, No. 303 C.D. 2007 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. June 1, 2007).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Koynok’s request
to appeal on June 28, 2008.  See Docket No. 35, Ex. B.
In September 2006, Koynok, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) against Dormont Borough and various Dormont
Borough employees in their individual and official capacities.  He sought injunctive relief
and monetary damages for claimed violations of his Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Eighth Amendment rights.  Specifically, he claimed that his constitutional rights were
violated during the course of his interactions with the ZHB, which allegedly:  held
hearings without proper notice; improperly issued, changed, and/or revoked zoning
regulations and property use permits; unfairly cited Koynok with zoning violations; failed
to adhere to applicable zoning regulations and Pennsylvania statutes; applied zoning
regulations unfairly to Koynok but not other similarly situated individuals; and retaliated
against him.  
    The doctrine takes its name from two United States Supreme Court cases: Rooker v.2
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983).
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Defendants moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Rather than
consider the motion, in November 2006, the District Court issued an order to show cause
why the case should not be stayed pending a decision by the Court of Common Pleas in
the underlying land use action – i.e., Koynok’s second state court action, in which he was
appealing the ZHB’s denial of his “special exception” request.  After briefing pursuant to
the show cause order, the District Court stayed the action based on the abstention
principles set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  It denied Defendants’
motion to dismiss without prejudice to re-filing the motion after resolution of the pending
state court proceedings.
In August 2008, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Koynok allowance
to appeal the Commonwealth Court’s decision concerning the “special exception”
request, Defendants moved to re-open the District Court action for the purpose of re-
filing their motion to dismiss.  The District Court granted reopening.  After briefing on
the motion to dismiss, the District Court entered an order applying the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and dismissing the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction.   It concluded that2
Koynok’s federal action is “nothing more than a collateral attack on state court
judgments” and that Koynok should not be permitted to re-plead his complaint because
     An issue adjudicated by the state court is “inextricably intertwined” with a plaintiff’s3
federal claims if, in order to grant relief: (1) the federal court must determine that the state
court’s judgment was erroneously entered; or (2) the federal court must take action that
5
“plaintiff’s affirmative averments demonstrate that . . . his cause of action is nothing more
than a ‘spin-off’ of a state court action . . . .”   It denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss as
moot.  Koynok pursued a timely appeal.
II.  Analysis
The District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a question of
federal subject matter jurisdiction over which we exercise plenary review.  See Whiteford
v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 672 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
where a federal action “would be the equivalent of an appellate review” of a state court
judgment.  FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d
Cir. 1996).  The doctrine occupies “narrow ground.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  It applies only in circumstances where “the
losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,
complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and
rejection of that judgment.”  Id. at 291.  
Rooker-Feldman applies to a claim that was “actually litigated” in state court, or
when a claim is “inextricably intertwined with [the] state adjudication.”  Desi’s Pizza v.
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).   It does not apply if a plaintiff presents3
would render the state court judgment ineffectual.  Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 421.
6
an independent claim in the federal action – even if that claim denies a legal conclusion
that the state court reached.  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293; see also Marran v. Marran,
376 F.3d 143, 154 (3d Cir. 2004) (a constitutional claim may be independent, even if it
has an effect on the state determination).   
Koynok argues that he did not (and could not) raise his constitutional claims in the
state court actions, which “were limited to on-the-record review of whether local zoning
hearing boards abused [their] discretion or committed error of law.”  He argues that his
federal action does not seek review of the state court decisions, but instead presents
independent claims.  In response, Appellees argue that “Koynok’s claims are exactly the
same issues raised in the previous state court lawsuits” and that his constitutional claims
are barred by Rooker-Feldman as “‘inextricably intertwined’ with the claims adjudicated
in the state court.”
We first address Koynok’s more recent state court proceeding, in which he pursued
a statutory appeal of the ZHB’s decision to deny him a “special exception.”  See Koynok
v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Borough of Dormont, No. 303 C.D. 2007 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
June 1, 2007).  When Koynok filed his District Court action, the “special exception”
proceedings were pending in the Court of Common Pleas and no decision had yet been
entered by any state court in that case.  The Supreme Court has held that where there are
parallel pending state and federal proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
    If, for example, the state court did not reach the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, then4
Rooker-Feldman does not apply.  See FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 841; Whiteford, 155 F.3d at
674.
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divest the federal court of jurisdiction.  Instead, if the state court reaches a judgment first,
preclusion principles apply to the federal action.  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292-93. 
Preclusion principles, unlike the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, do not strip the federal court
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 293.  Thus, while the recent state court proceedings
may preclude some (or all) of Koynok’s federal claims, they do not provide a basis for the
District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its consequent
determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Koynok’s federal action. 
 We next consider Koynok’s earlier state court proceedings, in which he pursued a
statutory appeal of the ZHB’s denial of his variance request.  Those proceedings
concluded before Koynok filed his District Court action, and could provide a basis for the
District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  However, on the sparse
record before us, we cannot adequately assess the issue.
Neither the parties nor the District Court provided information or court records
demonstrating what the court decided in Koynok’s first state court proceeding.  To
properly apply Rooker-Feldman, the first necessary step is to determine exactly what the
state court decided.   See Marran, 376 F.3d at 150; Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 421; Gulla v.4
N. Strabane Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998).  Without information about
what the state court decided, we cannot determine whether the District Court was correct
8in dismissing Koynok’s constitutional claims as “actually decided” or “inextricably
intertwined” with the issues in the state court action.  See, e.g., Logan v. Moyer, 898 F.2d
356, 357 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing the need for a complete record for appellate review of
decisions based on preclusion). 
For example, in the District Court Koynok purported to raise a substantive Due
Process claim, essentially arguing that the ZHB abused its power.  We have held that,
under certain sufficiently extreme circumstances, federal courts may consider Due
Process claims in the land use context without danger of becoming a “zoning board of
appeals.”  See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d
392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the “shocks-the-conscience” test to determine whether
a land use plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim); see also Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at
427 (“[T]he presence or absence of property rights under state law is not dispositive of
the question whether a person has a property interest protected by substantive due
process.”); Parkview Assocs. Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225 F3d 321, 326 (3d Cir.
2000) (Rooker-Feldman did not bar federal discrimination claim against zoning board,
despite state court decision upholding zoning board decision as supported by substantial
evidence).  Thus, it is possible that Koynok may have a constitutional claim that is
sufficiently independent of the state court proceedings to escape application of the
    However, we can say with some certainty that certain aspects of Koynok’s federal5
action appear to be barred, under either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or preclusion
principles.  Among other things, Koynok’s District Court complaint “seeks a declaration
that he is lawfully permitted to use his dwelling as a boarding-roominghouse” as well as
“permission to rent available sleeping rooms to the public as has been done for over 100
years . . . and awarding him such use now and in the future.”  Docket No. 1, Complaint at
13, 17.  It appears that such relief could not be granted without interfering with the
decisions in one or both of the state court actions, which also addressed Koynok’s request
to use his property as a boardinghouse. 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Without more information, however, we cannot say for sure.   5
III.  Conclusion
The record before us is insufficient to assess whether the District Court properly
dismissed Koynok’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  Indeed, while the most recent state court proceedings concerning
Koynok’s request for a “special exception” may likely have a preclusive effect, they
cannot provide a basis for the District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.  We therefore must vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the matter
for further proceedings.  We express no opinion as to whether the District Court has
jurisdiction in this case, or whether dismissal for any reason may or may not ultimately be
warranted.
